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Crises without frontiers
There is no need to go as far back as 
Carl Schmitt to realise that crises, if 
properly managed, may turn into op-
portunities. Barack Obama’s aides 
said as much – namely, that a good 
crisis should never be “wasted” – just 
after his election to the White House 
in the midst of the financial turmoil. 
The European Union itself has gone 
through a number of crises lately. 
There have been really bad ones, 
such as those related to the long and 
painful ratification of new treaties. 
But there have been also less bad 
ones: in late 2008, for instance, the 
EU put up a good showing when 
confronted first with the conflict in 
Georgia, then with the credit crunch 
in the US – including their reverbera-
tions. 
The sovereign debt crisis of the past 
few months, however, is in a cate-
gory all of its own: it is one generated 
inside the EU but also one exposed 
to global influences and conse-
quences. And it is a crisis that has 
disclosed structural weaknesses in the 
design of EMU that had hitherto 
been neglected, underestimated or 
deliberately overlooked. 
On a much smaller scale, even last 
month’s paralysis of air traffic across 
the continent – prompted by the ash 
from an unpronounceable Icelandic 
volcano – confronted both citizens 
and institutions with the kind of oc-
currence increasingly frequent in to-
day’s world, namely a major disrup-
tion of regular life and business that 
cuts across geographical borders and 
policy domains.
In both cases, remedies and solutions 
have been put in place to deal with 
their immediate and foreseeable ef-
fects. Lesson-learning exercises have 
been launched, with a view to assess-
ing the implications of such real-time 
crises for policy – and decision –
making procedures. In fact, “strategic 
surprises” are becoming ever more 
regular in tightly interconnected and 
globalised systems: as regulators as 
well as individual citizens, we have to 
prepare for the unexpected.
This issue of BEPA Monthly deals 
notably with these themes: the nature 
of EMU asymmetries as revealed by 
the Greek debt crisis, and the Euro-
pean solutions to date; the nature of 
“trans-boundary” crises and the gen-
eral requirements for tackling them; 
and the nature of democracy in 
Europe in light of the demands and 
expectations of citizens and the ca-
pacity of governments (at all levels) 
to meet them.
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Euro-pessimism is not of recent vintage; it has 
alternated with periods of high confidence in the 
European project during the past decades. Jean-
Jacques Servan Schreiber’s “Le Défi Américain” 
in the late 1960s, Michel Albert’s “Capitalism 
against Capitalism” in the early 1990s, Hans 
Werner Sinn’s “Ist Deutschland noch zu retten” 
and Nicolas Baverez’s “La France qui tombe” a 
few years ago, epitomize our fears that Europe is 
a loser in world competition. Even though some 
of those fears proved overblown, they often 
served as a stimulus for further EU action. 
Looking back at the history of European integra-
tion, one can detect a pattern of “from break-
down to breakthrough” in a number of defining 
moments: from the stagnation of the 1970s and 
1980s to the launch of the Single Market; from 
the asymmetries of separate liberalised national 
energy markets to the birth of one Single Market 
for energy services; and from the food safety 
scares of the 1990s (from mad cow disease and 
dioxins), to the emergence of an EU food safety 
policy “from stable to table”. More recent exam-
ples include the effective response to the threat 
of economic collapse in new Member States –
which were among the most heavily hit by the 
2008 financial crisis – and attempts to revive EU 
proposals for bringing about a single legislative 
framework for air traffic following the havoc 
created by the volcano eruption in Iceland.
Lessons learned: more leadership and more 
Europe
This history of downs and ups teaches us several 
lessons. One is that whereas crises bring about 
huge strains, they also create opportunities to 
move forward – because crises highlight weak-
nesses and policy blunders. A most meaningful 
lesson is that the best way to fight against crises 
threatening the fundamentals of integration is 
injecting more – not less – Europe into it. 
Nowadays, more Europe (namely, a better func-
tioning Union) would offset costs of uncertainty 
and declining expectations at a momentous time, 
when the Western world is entering an age of 
austerity and restraint. 
Another lesson is that policies have to be prag-
matic and not succumb to doctrinal fundamen-
talism. Timely action is essential. The complexity 
of the EU often makes forging consensus quite 
difficult. However, true statesmanship, leader-
ship and vision can break deadlocks in times of 
great need. Last but not least, policies must not 
lose sight of what the EU has delivered over 
time in terms of added value. Indeed, the EU 
project itself is an incalculably important public 
good in Europe’s modern history.
But it is also true that the current economic crisis 
is straining the EU, and in particular EMU, to an 
extent that finds no parallel in its history. There 
are new doubts over the viability of the single 
currency area. In a nutshell, the basic flaws of 
EMU are rooted in an incomplete economic un-
ion, which involves a non-existent fiscal union, 
insufficient real convergence, and ineffective pol-
icy coordination devices. A rule-based monetary 
union was probably good enough for the Maas-
tricht founding fathers, and was also uplifted by 
the Great Moderation period that followed. But 
it proves totally inadequate in today’s context of 
crisis and, arguably, in its aftermath. 
The short-term response to the Greek problem 
and to its wider, systemic implications will act as 
a buffer and will certainly pave the way to a 
longer-term approach to EMU. The Union is 
now compelled to act – concomitantly – along 
two intertwined tracks. One is an extremely am-
bitious exercise in crisis management, which has 
to deal with contagion effects, to calm down 
markets’ worries, to combat disruptive specula-
tive behaviour and, not least, to consider the is-
sues entailed by rescue operations and the ECB’s 
purchase of state bonds. A second track involves 
an overhaul of the functioning of EMU, of its 
mechanisms and coordination devices. The crea-
1 From possible breakdown to desirable breakthrough
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tion of the Stabilisation Fund is indeed at the 
intersection of these two tracks. 
A new breakthrough on the horizon?
There is now emerging cross-party and cross-
national political support for the idea of EMU 
renewal – preferably à traité constant, as any Treaty 
revision would inevitably lead to the emergence 
of many other side issues that deflect attention 
from the core problem at stake. The Council 
EMU Taskforce established by the EU Summit 
conclusions of 25 March, the ECOFIN break-
through decision of 9 May setting up a Stabilisa-
tion mechanism to shield the euro zone from 
potential threats, and the Commission Commu-
nication of 12 May have clearly set the stage for 
the desirable breakthrough to come. The Monti 
Report on the single market has also come at an 
appropriate time. Realistically, any future action 
will have to combine several elements:
Strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact in a wider 
conceptual perspective. Budget discipline remains 
key, and it is unfortunate that Member States, at 
various points in time, have been both saints and 
sinners in this respect. Rules for compliance have 
to be strict and enforceable. Strengthening the 
Pact’s preventive arm through a system of ex-
ante peer review of national budgets and stability 
and convergence programmes while at the same 
time reinforcing the corrective arm through 
more emphasis on fiscal consolidation are a 
must. 
However, this crisis has made glaringly clear that 
strains in EMU cannot be averted unless proper 
care is taken of other macroeconomic imbal-
ances. Reducing competitiveness gaps in EMU 
has to be a general concern, a means to 
strengthen the euro zone internally and to bol-
ster its cohesion externally. This demands genu-
ine reforms of labour markets and coordinated 
industrial policies which can bring about new 
competitive advantages for the benefit of the 
Union as a whole.
The experience of EMU’s southern members 
and of several new EU Member States shows 
that excessive credit and other bubbles need be prevented. 
A reformed regulatory and supervisory frame-
work of financial sectors should help prevent 
boom-and-bust dynamics in Member States. This 
needs be conceived in the wider framework of 
EU-wide policy coordination. Of particular im-
portance here is to work out ways of offsetting 
the deflationary bias of policies implemented in 
the countries which will be in the throes of ma-
jor fiscal consolidation programmes.
Improving surveillance. The use of indicators and 
alert thresholds (from the EU 2020 strategy and 
elsewhere), the establishment of links between 
reforms and the strategic priorities of cohesion 
policy programmes, and devising a toolbox for 
early warning capability (a Eurostat with much 
enforced prerogatives, audit-type included) also 
seem to be of high relevance in this context.
Setting up a permanent crisis resolution mechanism. 
Leaving aside issues of terminology, the recent 
threat of a breakdown has shown that establish-
ing such a facility is a must in view of deeper fi-
nancial integration in EMU and the ensuing sys-
temic risks. Since 10 May we have a crisis resolu-
tion mechanism with embedded guarantees for 
efficiency (and deterrence) which – although de-
signed under pressure from the dealing rooms –
clearly shows that regulators and politicians are 
ready to fight relentlessly those parts of markets 
which cause damage. 
The above mentioned endeavour should be seen 
in conjunction with the reforms underway re-
garding the regulation and supervision of financial mar-
kets. The financial sector has to return to its 
senses. The EU has firmly embarked on a wide 
ranging programme in this respect, and the 
power of vested interests should and can be de-
feated. The EU can play a central role in rethink-
ing and overhauling the governance of the inter-
national financial sector and use the G20 to this 
end. For the sake of fostering economic growth 
and open trade, the inherent instability of finan-
cial markets has to be reined in. This is why the 
overhaul of the regulation and supervision of 
financial markets must be comprehensive. The 
de Larosière and Turner Reports in the EU, and 
Paul Volcker’s “rules” in the US provide intellec-
tual firepower to this aim.
Trust and values revisited
Finally, a major challenge for policy implementa-
tion is “trust”. The profound financial crisis 
has highlighted the importance of this key ingre-
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dient in the functioning of democracies, and free 
economies. The loss of any moral compass by 
many actors – especially in finance – undermines 
the confidence people, as citizens, have in regula-
tors and democratic institutions. Moral values 
thus elbow their way onto the political agenda. 
The way to bridge the gulf between “Main 
Street” and “Wall Street” is to re-emphasise the 
values which brought prosperity to the West: 
hard work, duty, honesty, sense of guilt and 
shame, accountability, solidarity, compassion. 
Even in today’s globalised world, moral values 
do have an economic function: they make socie-
ties work and perform better. In a world of ex-
haustible resources and increasing competition 
and interdependence, the EU can – and early 
signs show that it will – rise to this challenge.
Trust also plays a key role in the functioning of 
the Union. Unless its rules are observed, mutual 
distrust grows, eroding the EU over time. Soli-
darity in times of need hinges on mutual trust 
among the Member States. This is another key 
lesson of the current crisis. 
The time for EMU renewal has come. The EU 
has accumulated a series of lessons that can now 
be used to build a new, sounder edifice that will 
help ensure financial stability of the euro area –
regardless of the broader economic outlook –
and help it achieve its growth potential. Are the 
political conditions now met for such a break-
through? Agreement on the timing and the need 
to act is unanimous, but profound disagreements 
still prevail on the prescription side. 
A change of mindset in the capitals of the euro 
zone is now called for. Dealing with the “E”, 
instead of simply lamenting the shortfalls linked 
to the “M” in EMU, calls for a sea change in 
mentalities and a re-think of traditional notions 
of sovereignty. After all, policy breakthroughs 
did not happen by respecting the status quo. 
They came about by reversing it through vision, 
courage and conviction.
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There was a time when the Commission could 
justifiably assume a low profile in crisis manage-
ment. The internal market was under construction, 
and globalisation had not quite enveloped the 
world. Community competences were still limited 
and expectations were low. When crises struck, 
they tended to be local in origin and impact, re-
quiring only small amounts of outside assistance.
Those days were rudely interrupted by the so-
called “mad cow” crisis that caught the EU by 
surprise. Sparked by a disease that travelled along 
European infrastructures, the crisis wreaked 
havoc across policy sectors. It threatened human 
lives as well as political careers. Although not the 
first of its kind, the ’mad cow’ event had an eye-
opening effect in Brussels. 
It was typical of what we may call a “trans-
boundary” crisis, an increasingly common occur-
rence on the European continent: the term 
“trans-boundary” emphasises its peculiar nature, 
which blurs and trespasses boundaries between 
both individual countries and policy areas. 
Known by their knock-on effects, such crises 
arrive in one form but soon take on new guises. 
Volcanic explosions, sub-prime loans, and com-
municable diseases, for example, are easy to ex-
plain in the first instance. What happens next is 
more difficult to predict, as initial crises trigger 
secondary effects that spread across geographi-
cal, political, and policy borders. The massive 
disruption of air traffic across Europe caused by 
the eruption of a volcano in Iceland has been the 
latest case in point.
In an interconnected, interdependent Europe, 
the Commission has some responsibility for 
managing trans-boundary crises. At issue is not 
whether she has all the legal competencies to do 
so (although in some cases she does): it is 
whether she can take the initiative to ensure that 
crises in the Union do not turn into crises for the 
Union. Nor is the issue whether she has the tools 
and instruments required to make quick, in-
formed decisions (although in many cases she 
has these, too): it is whether public opinion and 
political elites will perceive that the right deci-
sions have been made. To be sure, national gov-
ernments will almost always take the first blow. 
What happens afterwards may depends on many 
what action the EU takes.
Effective leadership in preparation for and dur-
ing crises is not easy, but past experience and 
studies of crisis management offer useful lessons. 
We believe that scientific research into crisis 
management has practical value – notwithstand-
ing the difficulty of trying to turn research find-
ings into “how-to” (or “how-not-to”).
Crisis leadership
Who leads during a crisis? At the national level, 
the answer is clear: Prime Ministers or Heads of 
State. At the European level, experience shows 
that EU institutions may be thrust into the lime-
light too. The public expects someone to take 
command and provide clear answers; a critical 
contingency is not the time to hide out or be 
driven by events but to remain visibly on top of 
the situation. And a trans-boundary crisis must 
be related to the fundamentals of the Union’s 
public mission, to the core storyline of integra-
tion and interdependence.
Regarding the Commission proper, the trade-off 
between leadership and collegiality is not as stark 
as it may seem. Due to the nature of both the 
Commission and trans-boundary crises, Com-
missioners have to cooperate. As a result, a 
“crisis team” of Commissioners could be envis-
aged: its composition will vary depending on 
which knock-on effects may arise; other Com-
missioners will need to be regularly briefed. Ex-
perience shows how easy it is to lose control of 
one’s team during a crisis – hence the proactive 
role the President himself and his immediate 
support structures should take up. 
During turmoil, it is indispensable to check how 
the crisis, and its handling, is reflected through 
2 Crisis management in the age of globalisation
By Mark Rhinard* and Bengt Sundelius**
* Mark Rhinard is Senior Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm.
** Bengt Sundelius is Professor of Government at Uppsala University.
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the media. Actions, and the appearances of ac-
tions (or inactions), are mirrored by the press. 
Fluid images of success or failure are framed 
through media reports of what was seemingly 
done (or not) in the crisis. 
It may also be worthwhile to establish “standard 
operating procedures” for the College during 
crises. Those can help put the Commissioners on 
the same page regarding the crisis decision-
making process (and prevent surprises). Such 
procedures normally begin by compiling relevant 
information, sorting noise from reality, and des-
ignating an ad hoc leadership team. The next 
step would be to activate an analysis function 
capable of enriching incoming information and 
avoiding “group-think”. After that, a palette of 
relevant and deployable instruments should be 
identified and made available, and a menu of de-
cision options discussed. 
Meanwhile, a public communication strategy 
must be activated. Once decisions are made, ade-
quate reporting of implementation (a major 
problem for crisis leadership) should be ensured, 
previous decisions regularly reviewed, and appro-
priate adjustments made. These “political” SOPs 
could be nicely put in sync with the more 
“technical” SOPs already established in many 
Commission services.
Uncertainty and complexity are the main features 
of a rapidly evolving trans-boundary crisis, often 
characterised by communication overload and, at 
the same time, information shortages. Research 
shows that some leaders jump to a decision as 
soon as evidence arrives to support pre-
conceived opinions. Other leaders take a mental 
time-out as communication pours in, paralysed 
by trying to make sense of it all. 
How information is filtered and summarized be-
fore it reaches decision-makers is therefore es-
sential. Trustworthy administrative support is 
required not only to marshal information, but 
also to assess potentially conflicting analyses. Es-
tablishing a central analysis function – to be 
placed as close to the President as possible –
could help “make sense” of a situation in a con-
fident way.
During a crisis, it is easy to find “escape op-
tions”. The problem can be shifted towards oth-
ers – vertically, horizontally, or laterally. By em-
phasizing legal constraints or procedural vaga-
ries, attention can be moved away from the sub-
stantive controversy at hand. A focus on consen-
sus-building can be used to draw out decisions. 
Some of these strategies may be valid, but there 
are crucial differences between calculated post-
ponement and avoidance of responsibility.
Crisis coordination and learning
Crises pull apart even the closest teams. The 
Commission writ large has few mechanisms to 
pull together during crises, and inter-service co-
ordination is not easy even in the best of times. 
Existing mechanisms may thus falter. Again, 
standard operating procedures can alleviate these 
centrifugal tendencies. Training and practice (as 
part of the solution for enhancing leadership “in-
between” crises) will make Commissioners more 
comfortable with their roles when a real crisis 
strikes.
The rare opportunity to learn lessons after a cri-
sis must be seized, too. Most organisations show 
scarce willingness to learn from painful crisis ex-
periences – and for understandable reasons: no 
one enjoys re-examining contentious decisions 
or re-visiting past battles. Ignoring valuable les-
sons, however, dooms to re-living the past and 
undermines reputation. Some national govern-
ments have found success in “institutionalising” 
lesson-learning exercises after major crises. The 
College could consider doing the same from a 
centralised location. 
The importance of lesson-learning also points 
towards the value of preparing for crises well 
before they arrive. Preparatory action, capacity 
building, training, and crisis management exer-
cises at the highest political levels (even the Col-
lege) should be a priority, with requisite adminis-
trative responsibility for such tasks. These invest-
ments build capacity to ensure that standard op-
erating procedures work effectively. 
Crises are not only threatening challenges to be 
“coped” with. Crises (and their aftermaths) offer 
space for changes of policy, procedures and in-
stitutional designs. A period of serious inquiry, 
evaluation and subsequent recommendations is a 
crucial stage between crisis and policy reform. It 
includes personal and organizational capacity for 
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engaging in meaningful accountability proce-
dures and evaluation processes.
Part of the sense-making process should be to 
consider how actions taken now will play out 
once the dust of emergency has settled. When 
the ordinary grind of political life again takes 
hold, draconian crisis measures will appear in 
another light. Difficult trade-offs between effec-
tiveness and legitimacy may then be judged dif-
ferently by the public than in the moment of de-
spair. 
One question is often asked ex post facto by in-
formed observers, such as scholars or journalists: 
a crisis for whom? This fundamental and thorny 
issue should be raised also by and within the EU: 
what are the stakes and who are the stakeholders 
of the unfolding event? Taking the time for 
some strategic reflection while in the eye of the 
storm is a good investment in a political future 
after the crisis has passed.
Effective crisis management entails the skill to 
balance often overwhelming information and 
expert recommendations with other equally im-
portant perspectives. Here, sensitivity to the 
wider political landscape is an important quality: 
a culturally based or personally constructed nor-
mative compass for any public action is a source 
of inner strength. Political leadership often 
means the ability to grasp and connect with the 
fleeting public view of what constitutes a reason-
able course of action in a given high-stakes situa-
tion. Crises offer windows of opportunity to 
move a nation or a Union – and to be able to 
take credit for having done so.
Crisis management is a high-wire balancing act 
without a safety net. One wrong step and politi-
cal reputations could be in tatters. Successful tip-
toeing along the suspended wire gives the thrill 
of a strong public endorsement and the envy of 
peers. In critical situations, leadership integrity is 
being put to the test. This is done in full public 
view thanks to the scrutiny of media. But crisis 
leadership is not an “art”. It is a skill acquired 
through forethought and practice.
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Democracy today – both in the EU per se and in 
its individual Member States – is suffering from a 
single disease: namely, the growing difficulty ex-
perienced by every government, whether central 
or local, to meet those demands of people and 
citizens which it is expected to. The gulf between 
the needs of the Demos and the performance of 
the Kratos is one of the most dangerous threats to 
the survival of democracy as a form of govern-
ment based on the principles of responsibility, 
autonomy and equality. It can only be corrected 
by intervening simultaneously on different levels 
of government: municipal, regional, national, 
European, and global.
Let us concentrate on Europe. The nationalist 
cliché pegs anti-Europeanism very closely to the 
theme of democracy. It does so, by and large, by 
arguing that the European Union is a political 
construction in which democracy is impossible 
because “there is no Demos”. Demos is a national 
phenomenon, ergo democracy’s true and only re-
pository is the nation state. It follows that 
Europe’s political union is impossible, unwel-
come and, above all, incompatible with the de-
mocratic ideal. This argument is both fallacious 
and dangerous. 
What Demos?
If we try to define the Demos, in fact, we find 
ourselves at a loss. History’s answers have varied 
over time and space: there is no single criterion 
that has survived unchanged and unchallenged 
down the centuries and across the continents. In 
Europe, the boundaries of government were 
mapped out for ages either on the battlefield or 
in the bed chamber, through military conquest or 
dynastic marriage. Human attempts to imple-
ment peace on earth through religion, language, 
race and class have ended up in bloodshed. Rea-
son, on the other hand, provides us with only 
one answer: it is necessary to establish a govern-
ment wherever needs, aspirations and demands 
shared by a given number of people can be 
achieved only through decisions, actions and re-
sources that are also shared. Without a govern-
ment there would be no peace or justice, and 
contracts could be breached at will. Without a 
government roads would not be built or main-
tained, nor would air and water be cleaned. 
What those being governed share most, in other 
words, is not affinity of taste or habit, mutual 
liking or sacrifice. It is a tension between close-
ness, contiguity and interdependence, on the one 
hand; and difference of opinion and preference, 
potential hostility and instinct to dominate, on 
the other. This combination of actual closeness 
and potential disagreement generates a sort of 
enforced coexistence, the most significant exam-
ple of which is the condominium. The romantic 
legend of nationhood (whereby any Demos can 
only come “from the heart”) has failed to recog-
nise this simple fact, but it has influenced our 
vision of statehood and democracy for over two 
centuries – which is, however, only a very short 
segment in the history of mankind. 
The Demos of democracy must be defined by rea-
son, not by the heart. It matters little whether 
people have chosen each other or not, or what 
common sentiments bind them together. More 
often than not, they have not chosen each other 
at all. They have simply come together in the 
same place, like tenants in a condominium who 
happen to own shares of the same building or 
like the migratory movements that led disparate 
groups of human beings to settle on the same 
lands. We are talking about people who fre-
quently find such closeness and interdependence 
irritating, who have a hard time putting up with 
differences of habit, taste and lifestyle. 
This means that we cannot talk about Demos
unless we also talk about things, i.e. the res pub-
lica: in fact, the need for government is sparked 
by demands and aspirations that are shared by 
more than one person and can be met only 
through decisions, initiatives and resources that 
are also shared. Economists call such things 
’public assets’, and define them as those goods 
3 Demos and Kratos in 2010 Europe
By Tommaso Padoa Schioppa*
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and services which neither the market nor indi-
vidual action are capable of generating – and 
which are the raison d’être of government. 
Economists also argue that public assets have the 
dual characteristics of non-exclusion and non-
rivalry: in other words, once they have been pro-
duced, no one can be prevented from using them 
nor does one person’s use of them reduce the 
quantity available to others. The armed forces 
defend every one, clean streets and clean air are 
clean for every one (including tax evaders).
But what does “everyone” mean – and what 
does “public” mean – in connection with the 
things that make up the Demos? Neither of those 
words has a single unequivocal meaning. The 
concept of ’every’ includes every condominium, 
every one living in the neighbourhood, every 
Walloon and every Flemish, every European and 
every living person in the world. 
Every one of us is part of a system of interde-
pendences on several levels. We share the use of 
the elevator and care for the roof with other ten-
ants. We share garbage collection and public 
parks with fellow citizens. We share public trans-
portation with others living in the same region. 
We share the administration of justice and the 
welfare system with the national community. We 
share the euro and the single market with other 
Europeans. And we share the greenhouse effect, 
air and maritime regulations with the whole 
world. 
Every one of us is a member of several different 
and ever wider human communities, each one 
defined by shared interests and mutual depend-
ence, and each requiring some form of govern-
ance.
What Kratos?
There are at least five such communities for every 
individual: a municipality, a region, a country, a 
continent, and the wider world. The term 
“government”, therefore, needs to be declined in 
the plural form, not only along the horizontal 
line of juxtaposition on the earth’s surface but also 
(and perhaps especially) along the vertical line of 
inclusion – the inclusion of ever larger and 
broader circles of human beings to which every 
one of us belongs at the same time. 
Government is needed because the Demos is split. 
Every public asset (from the elevator to the bio-
sphere) is one, but there are many ways of deliv-
ering it, and both opinions and interests differ 
over such ways. There must be someone who 
decides and acts for every one: that person needs 
to be endowed with an accepted code (a statute, 
a “constitution”), the legitimacy to take deci-
sions, and the wherewithal to act – even when 
some community members seek to hinder imple-
mentation. 
This is what we mean by Kratos. And what we 
call “general interest” is in fact a private interest 
shared by all, not the private interest of a third 
party. Government, at all levels, is not the player 
who consumes the public asset or service; if any-
thing, it is the player through whom the citizens 
that consume it collectively produce it. The expres-
sion “sacrificing private (national) interests to the 
general (European, global) interest”, although 
over-used, is therefore false. And if we were to 
list all of our private interests in hierarchical or-
der, we would immediately discover that the top 
places would be occupied by interests for which 
the government(s) alone can cater – namely se-
curity, justice, solidarity and education.
The citizens of Brussels, Turin, Seville, Copenha-
gen and Krakow will be living in a perfect de-
mocracy only when there is a government for 
each one of the communities of interdependent 
people they belong to, and when that govern-
ment meets the following two requirements: it is 
freely chosen by the people(s); and it has the Kra-
tos required to govern the res publica. Both are 
necessary because the term democracy is a com-
bination of two nouns.
On our continent today, however, we find our-
selves in an almost unmanageable situation: 
Europe, the EU, has been assigned achievable 
tasks but it has been denied the Kratos to achieve 
them; the nation state has been given the Kratos
but it has been assigned impossible tasks. These 
are two sides of the same (contradictory) coin –
and they risk jeopardising democracy itself. 
What Europe?
Four points need to be highlighted here. First, 
the European reason-based Demos does exist. 
This is even more obvious today than when the 
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groundwork for Europe’s construction was laid. 
The European res publica has expanded beyond 
measure as compared to half a century ago. Vir-
tually none of the traditional public assets are still 
exclusive and deliverable for any one of the 
27 national communities into which the people 
of Europe are still split – not even the largest 
among them, Germany, whose prosperity is 
based on exports; whose defence is entrusted to 
NATO; over which the winds blow polluted air 
from factories outside its borders; which puts its 
own brand names on products manufactured in 
other countries (inside and outside the EU); and 
which feels threatened by financial instability 
coming from the East, from various tax havens, 
and now also from inside the euro zone.
Second, a political construction based on the 
European res publica already exists. The Europe-
ans have enshrined their condition of mutual 
interdependence in what is – to all intents and 
purposes – their “constitution”: after all, what 
else can we call a shared law recognized de facto, 
de jure and in political doctrine as prevailing over 
national law? The EU Treaties list the common 
aims and aspirations, the assets, and the princi-
ples of the Union in a manner that is absolutely 
identical to the way the preamble of the first part 
of any nation state’s Constitution reads. And the 
Treaties establish institutions, ground rules and 
powers for the pursuit of aims and for the pro-
duction of public assets for the citizens of 
Europe – not the inhabitants of its individual 
Member States, regions, cities and villages. 
Third, the European “Constitution” is democ-
ratic. The institutions envisaged in the Treaties 
are built – albeit imperfectly – in accordance 
with the precepts of parliamentary democracy: 
the Parliament is elected by the people (a Demos
of Demoi) and the Commission enters into the 
fullness of its powers only upon that Parlia-
ment’s scrutiny and vote of confidence in it. Of 
course, no democracy is perfect, and the Union’s 
may well be less perfect than others – but it is 
totally inappropriate to talk about a “democratic 
deficit”. 
Fourth, a serious construction fault prevents the 
Union’s “government” from performing its task 
to the full. The fault concerns its ability to func-
tion properly, not its degree of representation or 
its link with the will of the people. Democracy 
has been implemented only in part, not because 
there is no European Demos but because the Kra-
tos is missing: the ability to make relevant deci-
sions and the capacity to implement them are 
simply not there. And this situation persists de-
spite the fact that the inhabitants of Europe have 
absolutely all the requisites to qualify as a reason-
based Demos and also to identify themselves as a 
Demos of the heart. 
What next?
The existence of a Demos of the heart is one 
thing – awareness of it is something else, and 
turning that awareness into political action is 
something else again. The memory of past hor-
rors is fading and, to the Erasmus generation, 
Europe often seems to be an edifice that has al-
ready been built and is being lived in – rather 
than one in need of completion and mainte-
nance. Europe is indeed incomplete, and for that 
reason – also for that reason – the democracy in 
which we live is incomplete. 
Where can we find the impulse to correct the 
current shortcomings in the construction of 
Europe, to complete Europe’s political unity 
and, thus, to fully implement democracy on our 
continent? Certainly not in the bed chamber, nor 
in the fire and sword of times past: those days 
are over and we know it. 
But we are fairly unlikely to find it in the roman-
tic legend of nationhood that led to the establish-
ment of the German and Italian nations as states 
(followed by many others: Estonia, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, Ukraine, Montenegro). Those days are 
over for Europe too. Governments use the myth 
of nationhood to which they owe their existence 
to obstruct or delay a EU government, and to 
cling to the simulacrum of their power even now 
that the problems they need to address have be-
come so much larger than they can handle. 
We do not know whether there will ever be a 
European federal state. What we do know, how-
ever, is that the future is open and unwritten; 
that Europe’s political unity is possible; that 
achieving it depends on us; and that without it 
our democracy will remain incomplete.
bepa monthly brief
11May 2010- Issue 37
The Monti Report
On 10 May 2010 Mario Monti delivered his re-
port “A New Strategy for the Single Market. At 
the Service of Europe’s Economy and Society” 
to President Barroso. The report is intended to 
serve as a basis for an initiative to relaunch the 
Single Market.
Professor Monti could rely on the Commission’s 
expertise and support to bring his mission to a 
successful conclusion. Specifically, BEPA sup-
ported him in the organisation of meetings with 
interlocutors at the Commission, the European 
Parliament or think tanks whose competences 
were relevant. This enabled him to gather views 
and opinions in order to prepare this important 
document that has been extremely well received 
all across the Union.
T h e  r e p o r t  i s  a v a i l a b l e  a t 
ec.europa.eu/bepa/expertises/visitor-programs/
mario_monti/index_en.htm
Activities
On 20 May BEPA organised for President Bar-
roso a seminar with American and European 
experts to discuss the state of transatlantic rela-
tions, the conditions for reinforcing the EU-US 
partnership, and the priorities for a common glo-
bal agenda in the 21st century. Alongside Cathe-
rine Ashton’s Head of Cabinet and representati-
ves of DG RELEX, the meeting was attended by 
experts from the German Marshall Fund, the 
Atlantic Council, the Center for Transatlantic 
Relations in Washington DC, and a number of 
European think tanks.
On 25 May BEPA organised a second seminar 
along the same lines on Russia, in cooperation 
with high-level Russian and American analysts 
from the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace. The objective of the meeting was to have 
a fresh look on recent developments in Russia –
in domestic and economic terms as well as on 
the international front – in the run-up to the for-
thcoming EU-Russia summit.
Nouveau directeur-général
Jean-Claude THEBAULT, jusqu’alors secré-
taire général adjoint de la Commission euro-
péenne, ancien Chef de cabinet adjoint du Prési-
dent Barroso, reprend la direction du BEPA. Son 
arrivée coïncide avec la finalisation de la restruc-
turation du BEPA mise en œuvre par Margaritis 
Schinas sous l’impulsion directe du Président.
Fort de ses expériences dans les Cabinets de Sil-
guy et Barroso I, il pourra mettre à profit, au ser-
vice du BEPA, ses compétences de haut niveau 
notamment dans les matières financières, budgé-
taires et de politique agricole commune. 
Toutefois, Jean-Claude Thébault sera avant tout 
l’animateur de notre Bureau, le faiseur d’idées 
nouvelles et le garant de leur mise en œuvre dans 
le but de servir au mieux le projet politique du 
Président. Pour se faire il bénéficie à la fois de 
son expérience passée à la tête de la Cellule de 
Prospective, mais aussi de l’équipe des Conseil-
lers du BEPA, récemment réorganisée.
Bepa online
Premier instrument phare de la reconquête de 
l’identité du BEPA, le site internet (www.http://
ec.europa.eu/bepa/index_fr.htm) nous permet-
tra de disposer d’une plateforme d’échange de 
nos idées et concepts grâce à une interface sim-
ple et noble dans laquelle notre visiteur puisse 
trouver en quelques “clics” l’information perti-
nente dans le domaine qui l’intéresse.
Outre les informations relatives à notre nouvelle 
organisation, vous retrouverez à titre principal, 
trois rubriques remises à jour très régulièrement : 
· nos dernières publications avec les docu-
ments, ouvrages et articles rédigés par les 
membres du Bureau ;
· les discours du Président rédigés par notre 
équipe de speechwriters ;
· nos expertises développées au cours des 
conférences et événements que nous organi-
sons ou encore par l’apport intellectuel pré-
cieux de nos “Visiteurs” dans le cadre du pro-
gramme exclusif mis en œuvre par le BEPA.
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